The election results are a heavy defeat with a twofold challenge for the Social Democrats.
Germany's Bundestag Elections 2025 have ushered in a transformative period in its political landscape, carrying significant implications not only for domestic politics but also for European and transatlantic relations. Our colleagues from the Analysis and Planning Department have prepared an in-depth report titled 'Analysis of the Bundestag Elections 2025: A Heavy Loss and New Challenges for the SPD'. Below is a concise summary of their key findings and interpretations most pressing for our transatlantic community.
There is no 'one' reason for the traffic light coalition's failure. In 2021, the Social Democrat led coalition of SPD, Greens and FDP emerged from the coronavirus pandemic with a lot of momentum and the promise of progress. The coalition agreement was ambitious in many respects, but from the outset it was based on the premise that the debt brake would be maintained and no additional redistributive measures (e.g. tax increases for the super-rich) would be implemented. Since the coronavirus pandemic, public confidence in the ability of politicians to act has declined, while public dissatisfaction with the coalition government has increased. Ultimately, the failure of the coalition government was due to political differences over funding and mistrust between the coalition partners.
If one were to take only the headlines from January onwards as an indicator of the election-determining issues, one would conclude that the positioning of the parties on refugee and asylum policy was the all-decisive election motive. However, this is a fallacy. If voters are asked what the most important issues are for their own voting decision, completely different issues come to the fore. The question of peace and security (45 percent) and improving the economic situation (44 percent) rank at the top of the agenda. Social justice follows with 39 percent, and only in fourth place, with a clear gap at 26 percent, is refugee and asylum policy mentioned. There is clearly a considerable discrepancy between the media-dominated agenda and what is actually important to citizens.
None of the centrist parties were able to break through the one-sided election campaign focused on migration and asylum policies with an agenda of their own. The media imbalance was only corrected in the TV debates, in which the leading candidates faced direct questions from citizens. Pensions, housing, healthcare and the geopolitical upheavals took center stage here. In these debates, there was also a lot of support for SPD concepts such as the reduction of VAT on food. The SPD also made significant gains in competence in the area of defense policy. However, these issues only played a subordinate role in the election campaign debate in the media.
The progressive camp emerged from these elections considerably weakened. The SPD, the Greens and the Left Party together account for just over 36 percent of the vote, and if the BSW is included, this figure rises by a further 5 percent. Experience from neighboring European countries such as Poland, France and the Netherlands suggests that the progressive camp should join forces to mobilize votes. However, this is currently not an option for Germany. First, because this election has also shown that majorities can be formed in the political center. Second, because the four parties have very different political positions, especially on foreign policy issues. Thirdly, the party-political structures in Germany are traditionally very strong. On the one hand, this makes cooperation beyond government alliances rather unlikely in organizational terms. On the other hand, it is also questionable whether the coalition would go down so well with the electorate, as political socialization and identification in Germany is more strongly tied to parties than in other countries.
The Left Party has a powerful role to play in the new Bundestag because, together with the AfD, it has a blocking minority and can prevent the 2/3 majority required for constitutional amendments. The CDU/CSU has ruled out cooperation with both the Left Party and the AfD in an incompatibility resolution. In this situation, the SPD has a special role to play, as it can act as a bridge to organize a 2/3 majority should this become necessary.
However, the electoral success of the Left Party has also shown that a clear focus on the core areas of left-wing politics can certainly meet with a positive response from the population. The reasons for the lack of recognition of the positive achievements of the government need to be examined more closely. At present, the desire for a shift from the left to the right seems to be greater than the desire for concrete changes in the core areas of left-wing politics.
The CDU/CSU has clearly ruled out cooperation with the AfD in the form of a coalition in the Bundestag. It is therefore unlikely that there will be any rapprochement in this parliamentary term. However, the so-called Brandmauer (firewall) prohibiting any cooperation with the AfD in the political arena has been breached. In the vote on a CDU/CSU motion to tighten migration policy, a majority could only be achieved with the votes of the AfD - a circumstance that the CDU/CSU condoned. The AfD's joy at the adoption of the motion was correspondingly great, since for the first time in the history of the German Bundestag it had contributed to the success of a motion - and thus its position was able to win a majority.
This breach of taboo damaged the firewall, but did not tear it down. However, this joint vote initiated by Merz will have consequences beyond the federal level. At local and regional level, there are always voices - especially in the eastern CDU - in favour of cooperation with the AfD. These voices could see the Bundestag vote as confirmation of their desire to tear down the firewall.
There is a recurring debate about whether cooperation with the AfD would disillusion it by giving it responsibility or moderate it politically. There are not many positive international examples of this. However, various studies show that the more right-wing populists are included in the political discourse, the more likely it is that their positions will be normalized and the overall discourse will change. The firewall should therefore remain in place. Conversely, this does not mean that the issues that the AfD has exploited should be ignored. After all the outcome of the Bundestag elections also shows what happens when an election campaign is dominated by the AfD's core concerns.
You can find the comprehensive analysis below!
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